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Abstract
Within the aﬃliated private-values paradigm, we develop a tractable empirical model of equi-
librium behaviour at ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auctions. The model is non-parametrically identiﬁed,
but the rate of convergence in estimation is slow when the number of bidders is even moderately
large, so we develop a semiparametric estimation strategy, focusing on the Archimedean family
of copulae and implementing this framework using particular members—the Clayton, Frank, and
Gumbel copulae. We apply our framework to data from low-price, sealed-bid auctions used by
the Michigan Department of Transportation to procure road-resurfacing services, rejecting the
hypothesis of independence and ﬁnding signiﬁcant (and high) aﬃliation in cost signals.
Key words: ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auctions; copulae; aﬃliation.
JEL classiﬁcation: C20, D44, L1.
1. Motivation and Introduction
During the past half century, economists have made remarkable progress in understanding
the theoretical structure of equilibrium strategic behaviour under market mechanisms, such as
auctions, when the number of potential participants is relatively small; see Krishna [18] for a
comprehensive presentation and evaluation of progress.
One analytic device commonly used to describe bidder motivation at single-object auctions
is a continuous random variable that represents individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity in valuations.
The conceptual experiment involves each potential bidder’s receiving an independent draw from
a distribution of valuations. Conditional on his draw, a bidder is then assumed to act purposefully,
maximizing either the expected proﬁt or the expected utility of proﬁt from winning the auction.
Another, frequently-made assumption is that the independent valuation draws of bidders are from
the same distribution of valuations; this is often referred to as the symmetric independent private-
values paradigm (symmetric IPVP). Under this assumption, the researcher can then focus on a
representative agent’s decision rule when describing equilibrium behaviour.
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This version: 5 October 2010At many real-world auctions, the latent valuations of potential bidders are probably depen-
dent in some way. In auction theory, it has been typically assumed that this dependence satisﬁes
aﬃliation, a term coined by Milgrom and Weber [24]. Aﬃliation is a condition concerning
the joint distribution of signals. In the case of continuous random variables, following Karlin
[17], some refer to aﬃliation as multivariate total positivity of order two (or MTP2, for short).
Essentially, under aﬃliation for continuous random variables, the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the
Hessian of the logarithm of the joint probability density of signals are all non-negative; i.e., the
joint probability density function is log-supermodular. Under joint normality of signals, aﬃlia-
tion requires that the pair-wise covariances be weakly positive. Krishna [18] as well as de Castro
[5] have also noted that aﬃliation implies positive correlation; i.e., aﬃliation is a much stronger
condition than positive correlation.
Investigating equilibrium behaviour at auctions, empirically, when latent valuations are af-
ﬁliated has challenged researchers for some time. Laﬀont and Vuong [20] have noted that
identiﬁcation is impossible to establish in many models when aﬃliation is present. In fact, one
result of Laﬀont and Vuong is that any model within the aﬃliated-values paradigm (AVP) is
observationally equivalent to a model within the aﬃliated private-values paradigm (APVP). For
this reason, when admitting dependence, nearly all empirical workers have considered models
within the APVP, the notable exception being Brendstrup and Paarsch [1].
Most structural econometric research devoted to investigating equilibrium behaviour at auc-
tions has involved single-object auctions within the symmetric IPVP. Examples include Paarsch
[28, 29]; Donald and Paarsch [6, 7, 8]; Laﬀont, Ossard, and Vuong [19]; Guerre, Perrigne, and
Vuong [13] (hereafter GPV, for short); Haile and Tamer [14]; and Li [21]. Paarsch and Hong
[30] have summarized some of the important empirical work in this area.
Only a few researchers have dealt explicitly with models within the APVP. In particular, Li,
Perrigne, and Vuong [22] have demonstrated non-parametric identiﬁcation within the condi-
tional IPVP, a special case of the APVP, while Li, Perrigne, and Vuong [23] (hereafter LPV, for
short) have demonstrated non-parametric identiﬁcation within the APVP. When implementing
their approach, LPV faced two related problems: ﬁrst, the LPV non-parametric estimator suﬀers
from the curse of dimensionality as the number of bidders gets large; second, their estimator is
plagued by the curse of dimensionality as the number of covariates gets large. Consequently, the
LPV estimator can be slow to converge. Most importantly, however, LPV do not impose aﬃlia-
tion in their estimation strategy, so the ﬁrst-order condition used in estimation need not constitute
an equilibrium.
In this paper, we investigate the advantages of using a semiparametric estimation strategy
as a dimension-reducing device to speed-up convergence. Speciﬁcally, we address the curse of
dimensionality stemming from the number of bidders at auction, not the number of covariates.
Under our approach, we also use the properties of a particular family of copulae to impose
aﬃliation, thus ensuring an equilibrium is satisﬁed by the measurement equation. We focus our
eﬀorts on aﬃliation within models of ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auctions, the most important auction
formatusedinpractice, atleastintermsofthevalueofgoodsandserviceseithersoldorprocured.
Our paper has seven remaining parts. In the next section, we brieﬂy deﬁne aﬃliation and
explain why it is used in theoretical models of auctions. Because the copula is central to our
analysis, in section 3, we present a brief review of the theory concerning copulae. Subsequently,
in section 4, we introduce a simple model of bidding at ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auctions in which
aﬃliation is imposed on the copula to guarantee a unique, monotone pure-strategy equilibrium.
In section 5, we propose a semiparametric estimator, demonstrating that it is consistent and
deriving its asymptotic distribution; we also demonstrate that the proposed estimator attains the
2optimal rate of convergence. In section 6, we investigate the small-sample properties of our
estimator using Monte Carlo methods, while in section 7, we apply our methods in an empirical
investigation of low-price, sealed-bid, procurement-contract auctions held by the Department of
Transportation in the State of Michigan. We summarize and conclude in section 8, the ﬁnal
section of the paper. In an appendix, we collect several lemmata (and their proofs) that are too
cumbersome and detailed to include in the text of the paper; we also document the creation of
the data set used.
2. Deﬁnition and Use of Aﬃliation
Suppose valuations V1, V2, ..., Vn have joint probability density function fV(v) where v col-
lects(v1,v2,...,vn), withlower-caselettersdenotingrealizationsofupper-caserandomvariables.
Consider v′ and v′′. The random variables V are said to be aﬃliated if
fV(v′ ∨ v′′)fV(v′ ∧ v′′) ≥ fV(v′)fV(v′′) (1)
where







denotes the component-wise maxima of v′ and v′′, sometimes referred to as the join, while







denotes the component-wise minima, sometimes referred to as the meet. Aﬃliation is suﬃcient
to guarantee conditions important in delivering a unique, monotone, pure-strategy equilibrium
(MPSE). de Castro [5] has also noted that aﬃliation is a stronger condition than is necessary to
guarantee a unique MPSE.
3. Some Results concerning Copulae
The main analytic device we use to organize our analysis is the copula. Nelsen [26] has provided
a detailed introduction to the theory of copulae. Here, we simply repeat some basic facts that are
relevant to our later work as well as establish a notation. In what follows, for expositional rea-
sons, for the most part, we restrict our discussion to bivariate copulae, but the results generalize
to the case of n variables easily. Given two variables, U1 and U2, a bivariate copula C(u1,u2) is
a continuous function having the following properties:
1. Domain(C) = [0,1]2;
2. C(u1,0) = 0 = C(0,u2);
3. C(u1,1) = u1 and C(1,u2) = u2;



















3Because U1 and U2 are both deﬁned on the unit interval, they can be viewed as uniform random
variables with C(u1,u2) being their joint distribution function. Alternatively, U1 and U2 can be
viewed as the cumulative distribution functions of two random variables V1 and V2 which are
collected in the vector V. In this case, their marginal distribution functions F1(v1) and F2(v2) are
linked to their joint distribution FV(v1,v2) by
FV(v1,v2) = C[F1(v1),F2(v2)].
One attractive feature of copulae is that the marginal cumulative distribution functions do not
depend on the choice of the dependence function for the two random variables in question. When
one is interested in the association between random variables, copulae are a useful device to use
because the dependence structure can be separated from the marginal cumulative distribution
functions.
Weknow, too, fromSklar’sTheorem, thatthecopulaCalwaysexists, andisauniquefunction
linking FV(v1,v2) with F1(v1) and F2(v2). Of course, when V1 and V2 are independent, the copula
is a trivial function as
FV(v1,v2) = F1(v1) × F2(v2).
Also, if we introduce the copulae
U(u1,u2) = min(u1,u2)
and
B(u1,u2) = max(0,u1 + u2 − 1),
then the following inequalities hold:
B(u1,u2) = max(0,u1 + u2 − 1) ≤ C(u1,u2) ≤ min(u1,u2) = U(u1,u2),
which are known as the Fr´ echet–Hoeﬀding bounds.
Consider now S 1 and S 2 which are, respectively, two strictly increasing functions of V1 and
V2, denoted σ1(V1) and σ2(V2). Denote the cumulative distribution functions of S 1 and S 2 by














To wit, the copulae of two random variables and two strictly increasing functions of those two
random variables are identical. This result is Theorem 2.4.3 of Nelsen [26].
Diﬀerent families of copulae exist. A simple, and commonly-used, family of copulae that
admits non-linear dependence is the Archimedean family, which is uniquely characterized by its
generator function ζ( ) where
Cζ(u1,u2) = ζ−1[ζ(u1) + ζ(u2)]. (2)
Here, ζ( ) is a convex, decreasing function. Note, too, that ζ(1) must equal zero and ζ−1(u) must
be zero for any u exceeding ζ(0). These conditions are both necessary and suﬃcient for Cζ to





4Table 1: Commonly-Used Archimedean Copulae
Member Copula ζ(u;θ) Domain
Clayton (u−θ
1 + u−θ
2 − 1)− 1
θ 1


















(−logu1)θ + (−logu2)θ  1
θ
 
(−logu)θ θ ∈ [1,∞)
which generalizes naturally to n-variates.
Three commonly-used members of the Archimedean family of copulae are the Clayton,
Frank, and Gumbel copulae. In table 1, we present the copula and generator functions of each
as a function of a dependence parameter θ. What interpretation can be given to the dependence
parameter θ? Consider the Frank copula: in the bivariate case, the larger is a positive value of
θ, the greater the concordance, positive dependence. On the other hand, a very negative value of
θ indicates negative dependence. Independence obtains when θ approaches zero. Note that, for
the Frank copula, when n exceeds two, θ is restricted to be positive because a negative θ would
imply a non-monotonic inverse-generator function; see example 4.22 in Nelsen [26]. Similar
interpretations exist for the Clayton and Gumbel copulae and can be also found in Nelsen [26].
M¨ uller and Scarsini [25] have characterized various notions of positive dependence, such as
MTP2 and conditionally increasingness in sequence (CIS) for Archimedean copulae.1 They have
also presented a general condition that the generator of an arbitrary Archimedean copula must
satisfy in order to guarantee that MTP2 holds (cf. Theorem 2.11 in their paper).
For the Frank copula, Genest [11] has demonstrated that the relevant condition for total
positivity of order two (TP2) coincides with the condition that guarantees a monotonic inverse-
generator function when n exceeds two; viz., θ must be positive. Although Genest’s condition
for TP2 only concerned bivariate copulae, it can be applied to multivariate Frank copulae, too.
For it is well-known that a function is MTP2 if and only if it is TP2 in all pairs of its arguments.
For the Clayton copula, the parameter θ must be positive if that copula is to satisfy TP2, while the
parameter θ of the Gumbel copula must be (weakly) greater than one if that copula is to satisfy
TP2.
4. First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction Model with Aﬃliation
We consider a model in which each of n(≥ 2) potential bidders draws a valuation V from
the joint distribution FV(v) where Fi(vi) denotes the marginal cumulative distribution function of
bidder i. Now, by Sklar’s theorem, there exists a unique copula function C such that
FV(v) = C[F1(v1),F2(v2),...,Fn(vn)].
For notational simplicity, however, we consider the case where Fi( ) is the same for all bidders
and equals F0( ); this is the symmetric APVP. The extension to the asymmetric APVP is straight-
forward, but incredibly cumbersome and tedious, notationally speaking. Under the symmetric
APVP,
FV(v) = C[F0(v1),F0(v2),...,F0(vn)].
1We are grateful to Professor Alfred M¨ uller for sharing with us his extensive knowledge and insights concerning
MTP2 and the Archimedean family of copulae.
5Let V−1 denote (V2,...,Vn), so V without V1. The following lemma is key to our derivation of
the equilibrium bid function:
Lemma 1. Assume that FV(v1,...,vn) is a symmetric distribution that can be expressed as
FV(v1,...,vn) = C[F0(v1),...,F0(vn)]
where C is a copula and F0( ) is the marginal distribution of vi. The conditional distribution
FV−1|V1(v2,...vn|v1) can be expressed as
FV−1|V1(v2,...vn|v1) = C1[F0(v1),F0(v2),...,F0(vn)]
where C1 is the partial derivative of C with respect to the ﬁrst component.
Proof.




   
  vn
fV(u1,...,un) du1    dun.
Diﬀerentiating both sides of the last equality with respect to v1 yields
C1[F0(v1),...,F0(vn)]f0(v1) =
  v2
   
  vn
fV(v1,u2,...,un) du2    dun.
Thus,   v2    
  vn fV(v1,u2,...,un) du2    dun
f0(v1)
= C1[F0(v1),...,F0(vn)]. (3)
But the left-hand side of equation (3) is just FV−1|V1(v2,...vn|v1), so the desired result obtains.
Note that the assumption of symmetry is unnecessary to our proof; we use it to simplify
notation as we shall only investigate the symmetric APVP in our empirical work below. Note,
too, that at this stage no structure has been assumed of C( ). Speciﬁcally, we have not imposed
aﬃliation. Aﬃliation is a suﬃcient condition assumed by Milgrom and Weber [24] to guarantee
a unique MPSE in the game speciﬁed below.
Within the symmetric APVP, we can consider the behaviour of any bidder so, without loss
of generality, we focus on bidder 1 who has value v1 and is assumed to maximize his expected
proﬁt
E[π(s1,v1)] = (v1 − s1)Pr[V2 ≤ σ−1(s1),...,Vn ≤ σ−1(s1)|v1]




by choice of bidding strategy s1, where σ( ) denotes the strictly increasing bidding strategy and
where the second equality follows from Lemma 1. Under symmetry, and after some algebra, the
ﬁrst-order condition yields




6A suﬃcient condition for equation (4) to characterize a unique MPSE is that the copula C( )
satisfy MTP2, which we now assume it does.
Introducing G0( ) to denote the marginal distribution of equilibrium bids and g0( ) to denote








Thus, re-arranging terms of the ﬁrst-order condition in equation (4) yields




where we use the fact that the copula C( ) is invariant under strictly-increasing transformations
of its arguments.
5. A Semiparametric Estimator
We frame the intuition behind our estimation strategy in terms of the previous literature and
then, subsequently, demonstrate parameter consistency and asymptotic normality of our estima-
tor later in this section. Consider a sample of T auctions at which no reserve price exists, so
issues of participation can be safely ignored. In this case, each of the n participants has tendered





these estimates by   G0(s) and   g0(s). From these, again using the sample data, one can then
estimate C[F0(v1),...,F0(vn)] non-parametrically using standard methods for copulae; see, for
example, Nelsen [26] as well as Brendstrup and Paarsch [1]. Based on these, one can then form
the pseudo-values according to
  Vit = S it +
  C1[  G0(S it),...,   G0(S it)]
(n − 1)  g0(S it)  C12[  G0(S it),...,   G0(S it)]
.
Note, however, that standard kernel-smoothing techniques typically do not guarantee that   C( )
satisﬁes MTP2. However, if the true copula C0( ) satisﬁes MTP2, then   C( ) will converge in
probability to C0( ).
In addition, if n is even moderately large, then a non-parametric estimator of the copula C( )
may be slow to converge. Thus, we advocate using semiparametric methods. In particular, one
can still estimate both G0(s) and g0(s) non-parametrically, but now put some structure on the
copula C( ). For example, suppose that C( ) is a member of the Archimedean family which is
uniquely characterized by the generator function ζ( ).
One ﬂexible way of estimating the generating function ζ( ) would involve introducing a fam-
ily of shape-preserving polynomials. One would then estimate the coeﬃcients of these polyno-
mials. The estimation strategy would involve allowing the number of terms in the polynomials
7to increase as the sample size increased, but at a rate which is slower than that of the sample size.
Sieve estimation is an example of such a method; see, for example, Chen and Shen [3]. A draw-
back of this approach is that the polynomial approximations of ζ( ) need not satisfy MTP2, so the
ﬁrst-order condition used to deﬁne the pseudo-valuations need not correspond to an equilibrium.
Alternatively, consider a family of copulae that is known up to some ﬁnite p-dimensional
parameter vector θ, so C( ;θ). A number of members of the Archimedean family have simple
parametric representations which can be easily constrained to respect aﬃliation, MTP2. When
the true copula C0( ) belongs to a parametric family
C = {Cθ, θ ∈ Θ}
deﬁned by the vector θ, then a parameter-consistent and asymptotically-normal estimator of θ0,
the true value, can be obtained by applying the method of maximum likelihood.
Now, under the hypothesis of equilibrium, from Theorem 2.4.3 of Nelsen [26], we know
that the parameter vector θ0 which characterizes the degree of aﬃliation in the joint distribution
of valuations is the same parameter vector which characterizes the degree of aﬃliation in the
joint distribution of equilibrium bids. Thus, we can focus on observed bids when estimating the
dependence in unobserved valuations.
Thus, we estimate G0
0(s), the marginal cumulative distribution function of S using







1(S it ≤ s).
Here, [1/(nT + 1)] is used to scale the cumulative sum in the deﬁnition of the empirical dis-
tribution function to avoid boundary problems encountered when implementing the copulae.
Subsequently, we insert   G0( ) into the logarithm of the likelihood function and maximize with
respect to the parameter vector θ.2 Because   G0( ) is diﬀerent from the true population cumula-
tive distribution function G0
0( ), we refer to this method as pseudo maximum-likelihood (PML)
estimation.
Of course, if C0 depends on a parameter, then so too does the support of G0
0( ), so one of
the regularity conditions imposed by maximum-likelihood estimation is violated. To see this,
consider the following fully parametric model where the marginal probability density function
depends on a vector of unknown parameters γ, so f0(v;γ). Under this assumption, not only
does the marginal probability density function of S depend on γ, it also depends on the copula
parameter vector θ, so g0(s;γ,θ). In addition, the upper bound of support of S depends on γ and
θ, so
v ≤ s ≤ ¯ s(γ,θ) = σ(¯ v)
where v and ¯ v are the lower and upper bounds of support of V, respectively.
What to do? Well, it turns out that, under our proposed approach, one can ignore this support
problem. In fact, this is one of the most compelling features of our approach. To see how this
works, consider the simple case where n is three. The joint density function of bids, can be
2Fermanian and Scaillet [10] have shown that the bias is smaller under a two-step approach than when the model is
estimated at one go—i.e., when the parameters of the marginal distribution and those of the copula are estimated simulta-
neously. Furthermore, they have argued that there is “little to lose but lots to gain from shifting towards a semiparametric
approach” in terms of eﬃciency.
8written in terms of the copula and the marginal cumulative distribution and probability density
functions of S at auction t as
C123[G0(s1t;γ,θ),G0(s2t;γ,θ),G0(s3t;γ,θ);θ]g0(s1t;γ,θ)g0(s2t;γ,θ)g0(s3t;γ,θ),








log[g0(s1t;γ,θ)] + log[g0(s2t;γ,θ)] + log[g0(s3t;γ,θ)].
As mentioned above, one of the regularity conditions used to prove the parameter-consistency of
the maximum-likelihood estimator is violated because ¯ s(γ,θ), the upper bound of support of the
strategy, depends on the parameters in the logarithm of the likelihood function.
Consider now our semiparametric, PML estimator. A major diﬀerence between our approach
and the fully parametric approach is that we do not specify parametric functional forms for F0( )
and, consequently, G0( ). Instead, we use the observed bids to estimate G0( ), which can then be












C123[  G0(s1t),   G0(s2t),   G0(s3t);θ]
 
+ log[  g0(s1t)] + log[  g0(s2t)] + log[  g0(s3t)].
Clearly, the upper bound of support ¯ s(γ,θ) still depends on θ, but this does not cause us any
technical problems because, when we search over θ,   g0(sit) is always positive as it does not
depend on θ, unlike in the fully parametric case, so it can eﬀectively be ignored. In the fully
parametric approach, values of γ and θ can result in g0(sit;γ,θ)’s being zero, so its logarithm is
then undeﬁned.
5.1. Asymptotic Properties of the Estimator
As mentioned, given an initial estimate   G0( ), we propose to estimate the copula dependence
parameter by maximizing the following pseudo log-likelihood function:





logC1,...,n[  G0(s1t),...,   G0(snt);θ]
with respect to the unknown parameter vector θ, having constrained θ to respect aﬃliation,
MTP2. Thus, the PML estimator ˆ θ is
ˆ θ = argmax
θ
  L(θ).
As noted by Chen and Fan [2], the main diﬃculty in establishing the asymptotic properties
of ˆ θ is that the score function and its derivatives can approach inﬁnity (become undeﬁned) at
9the boundaries of the space under alternative choices of copula functions. To circumvent this
problem, Chen and Fan [2] introduced a weighting function. Their approach is as follows: ﬁrst,
they established convergence of the non-parametric estimator for the marginal distribution in a
weighted metric and, then, they established the asymptotic properties of the copula dependence
parameter(s). Speciﬁcally, the weighting function is constructed so that it equals one when the
score function and its derivatives are deﬁned at the boundary; otherwise, the weighting function
is deﬁned to be some smooth function that becomes zero at the boundaries—zero and one. Al-
though Chen and Fan [2] investigated the estimation of copula-based semiparametric time-series
models using the copula to model the joint distribution of the time series Yt and Yt−1, leaving the
marginal distribution unspeciﬁed, their weighting-function approach can be applied in our case.
We make the following assumptions that apply to our auction application:
A1. {(S 1t,...,S nt)}T




0( ) is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue mea-
sure on the real line and C( ,..., ;θ0) is the true parametric copula for (S 1t,...,S nt), which
is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on [0,1]n, and does not attain
either the lower or the upper bounds of Fr´ echet–Hoeﬀding described in section 3.
A2. θ0 ∈ Θ, a compact set in Rp, and E[ℓθ(U1,...,Un;θ0)] equals zero, if and only if θ equals
θ0, where
ℓθ(u1,...,un;θ) ≡ ∇θ logC1,...,n(u1,...,un;θ).
A3. ℓθ(u1,...,un;θ) is deﬁned for (u1,...,un) ∈ [0,1]n×Θ and for all θ0 ∈ Θ; ℓθ(u1,...,un;θ)
is Lipschitz continuous at θ almost surely; ℓθ,i(u1,...,un;θ) for i = 1,...,n are deﬁned
and continuous in (u1,...,un;θ) ∈ [0,1]n × Θ.
A4. E{supθ∈Θ ||ℓθ(U1,...,Un;θ)||log[1 + ||ℓθ(U1,...,Un;θ)||]} < ∞.
A5. E{supθ∈Θ,G∈Gδ ||ℓθ,i[G(S 1t),...,G(S nt);θ]||w(Ui)} < ∞ where Gδ equals {G ∈ G : ||G −
G0
0||G ≤ δ} with G being the space of continuous probability distributions over the support
of S it, and w(v) denotes [v(1 − v)]1−ξ for v ∈ (0,1) and ξ ∈ (0,1).
Note that these assumptions are adapted from those in Chen and Fan [2]. While Chen and Fan
considered time-series data with two variables Yt and Yt−1, we consider data from a cross-section
of n variables (S 1t,...,S nt). The following proposition states the consistency result of ˆ θ.




The proof of Proposition 1, which follows closely the proof of Proposition 4.2 in Chen and Fan
[2], is omitted as it is straightforward. For the asymptotic distribution, following Chen and Fan
[2], we make the following assumptions:
10A6. (i) A2 is satisﬁed with θ0 in the interior of Θ; (ii) B ≡ −E[ℓθ,θ(U1,...,Un;θ0)] is positive
deﬁnite; (iii) Σ ≡ limT→∞ Var(
√

















   
  1
0
[1(Ui ≤ vi) − vi]ℓθ,i(v1,...,vn;θ0)C1,...,n(v1,...,vn;θ0) dv1    dvn;
(iv) ˆ θ = θ0 + oP(1) and sups |[  G0(s) −G0
0(s)]/w[G0
0(s)]| = OP(T−1/2) where w( ) is deﬁned
in A5.
A7. ℓθ,θ(u1,...,un;θ) and ℓθ,i(u1,...,un;θ) for i = 1,...,n are all deﬁned, and continuous in
(u1,...,un,θ) ∈ [0,1]n × Int(Θ).
A8. Itisvalidtointerchangetheorderofdiﬀerentiationandintegrationofℓθ[Gη(s1t),...,Gη(snt);θη]
with respect to η ∈ (0,1) where {(θη,Gη) : η ∈ [0,1]} ⊂ Fδ ≡ {(θ,G) ∈ Θ×Gδ : ||θ −θ0|| ≤
δ} for a small δ, is a one-dimensional smooth path in Fδ.
A9. Both E{sup(θ,G)∈Fδ ||ℓθ[G(S 1t),...,G(S nt);θ]||}2 < ∞ and E{||
 n
i=1 Wi(Ui)||2} < ∞.
A10. E{sup(θ,G)∈Fδ ||ℓθ,θ[G(S 1t),...,G(S nt);θ]||}2 < ∞.
A11. E{sup(θ,G)∈Fδ ||ℓθ,i[G(S 1t),...,G(S nt);θ]||w(Ui)}2 < ∞ for i = 1,...,n.
These assumptions are modiﬁed versions of those in Chen and Fan [2] because we consider data
from a cross-section case, while they consider data from a time-series. We can now state the
following result concerning the
√
T asymptotic normality of ˆ θ.
Proposition 2. Under A6–A11,
√




0( ) known, then
 n
i=1 Wi(Ui) would disappear from AT and, thus, from Σ. In other
words, the term
 n
i=1 Wi(Ui) is introduced because G0
0( ) is unknown and must be estimated.
For ease of exposition, the preceding asymptotic results were established for the case where
auctioned objects are homogenous. The results can, however, be readily extended to the case
where the auctioned objects are heterogenous and are conditioned on a d-dimensional vector of
covariates X.
115.2. Optimal Uniform Convergence Rate: Estimator of fV
Having obtained the PML estimator ˆ θ, we can now calculate the pseudo private-values. To
this end, in addition to the non-parametric estimator of the marginal cumulative distribution, we










s − S it
hg
 
where hg is a bandwidth and κg( ) is a kernel with a compact support whose length is ρg. Let S min
and S max denote the minimum and maximum of the nT observed bids, and deﬁne the pseudo
private-value corresponding to S it as





  C1[  G0(S it),...,  G0(S it)]
(n−1)˜ g0(S it)  C12[  G0(S it),...,  G0(S it)] if S min + ρghg/2 ≤ S it ≤ S max − ρghg/2
∞ otherwise.
Note that, here, the trimming, which follows GPV, is necessary because ˜ g0( ) is biased near the
boundaries. The pseudo private-values   Vit can then be used to estimate the marginal probability
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where hf is a bandwidth and κf( ) is a kernel with compact support.
Since we can also estimate the marginal distribution of private values by







1(  Vit ≤ v),
we can now estimate the joint density of n private values by








GPV studied the optimal rate of uniform convergence of the non-parametric density estimator
˜ f0( ) when the n private values are independent. In this case, the private value can be expressed
as
Vit = S it +
G0(S it)
(n − 1)g0(S it)
and the pseudo private-values can be deﬁned accordingly. It turns out that under suitable regular-
ity conditions, we can establish the optimal rate of uniform convergence for ˜ f0( ), which is given
in the next proposition.




12is continuously diﬀerentiable in both u and θ in (0,1)×Int(Θ) with all derivatives being bounded
in absolute value; and (iii) hg = cg(logT/T)1/(2R+3) with hf = cf(logT/T)1/(2R+3), then
sup
v∈ζ(V)
| ˜ f0(v) − f0(v)| = O((logT/T)R/(2R+3)) almost surely
for any closed inner subset ζ(V) of the support of f0( ) where (logT/T)R/(2R+3) is indeed the
optimal uniform convergence rate for two-step non-parametric estimators of the density f0( )
from the observed bids.
Proposition 3 follows directly from Theorems 2 and 3 in GPV because of the diﬀerentiability of
H(u,θ) assumed in (ii) above. A comparison of our estimator ˜ f0( ) to the one in GPV indicates
that our estimator behaves (asymptotically) in the same way as the one in GPV provided that
(ii) is met: once this condition is satisﬁed, {  C1[  G0(S it),...,   G0(S it)]/  C12[  G0(S it),...,   G0(S it)]},
which is now H[  G0(S it), ˆ θ], behaves like   G0(S it), at least asymptotically, so
S it +
1
(n − 1)˜ g0(S it)
  C1[  G0(S it),...,   G0(S it)]
  C12[  G0(S it),...,   G0(S it)]
behaves like
S it +
  G0(S it)
(n − 1)˜ g0(S it)
,
at least asymptotically. In particular, as in Lemma B2 in GPV, we can show that the uniform rate
of convergence of H[  G0(S it), ˆ θ] over an expanding subset is the same as that of   G0(S it), which is
(logT/T)(R+1)/(2R+3). Furthermore, because of this proposition, and the way in which we estimate
the joint density of private values, we can obtain the same optimal uniform rate of convergence
for the joint density estimator of private values, which is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, the optimal uniform convergence rate of
˜ fV( ,..., ) is also (logT/T)R/(2R+3).
The result given in Corollary 1 is worth some discussion. It implies that the joint density of
private values can be estimated at the same rate as the marginal density of private values. The
semiparametric nature of our approach—imposing a parametric copula speciﬁcation for the joint
distribution of private values (and, hence, bids) while leaving the marginal distribution of bids
unspeciﬁed—delivers suﬃcient structure to guarantee this rate of convergence. Thus, the two-
step nature of our estimation strategy parallels that considered by GPV. Consequently, the con-
vergence rate is faster than the rate of the fully non-parametric LPV estimator.
Following Theorems 2 and 3 of GPV, Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 can be readily extended
to the case of heterogenous objects; i.e., the probability density and cumulative distribution func-
tions can be conditioned on a d-dimensional vector of covariates, viz., X. Then, the optimal
uniform convergence rates for both ˜ f0( | ) and ˜ fV( ,..., | ) are (logT/T)R/(2R+d+3). Of course, in
this case, the non-parametric estimators of   G0(s|x), ˜ g0(s|x), and ˜ f0(v|x) need to be accordingly
modiﬁed following GPV.
As mentioned above, the LPV estimator suﬀers from the curse of dimensionality in two ways.
The ﬁrst is the dimension n—viz., the number of bidders at the auction, which determines the
dimensionofjointdensityofprivatevalues; thesecondisd, thedimensionofthecovariatevector.
We have demonstrated that, under our approach, the optimal rate of convergence obtains when
13a parametric copula is used because this reduces the n dimension to one; the d dimension still
remains. Our method is especially useful when the number of bidders is large. Our estimator,
however, still does not address the problem caused by a large number of covariates. In this
regard, it would be useful to consider possible extensions of our semiparametric estimator. One
such extension would involve a single index model, which can be used to reduce the curse of
dimensionalityintroducedbyd. Ofcourse, thepriceofthesingle-indexassumptionisareduction
of ﬂexibility and generality.
Note, too, that when estimating the underlying distribution of private values using the ob-
served bids, our semiparametric approach speciﬁes a parametric copula with a dependence pa-
rameter, whilenonparametricallyestimatingthemarginaldistributionoftheprivatevalues. There-
fore, our semiparametric estimator is diﬀerent from most of the semiparametric estimators de-
rived within a regression framework; for example those studied by Newey and McFadden [27].
The objective in that reseearch is to estimate the parametric part of the model, while treating the
nonparametric part as a nuisance parameter (albeit of an inﬁnite dimension). Despite this diﬀer-
ence, our estimator of the dependence parameter attains
√
T rate of convergence (see Proposition
2), which is the common rate for the class of semiparametric estimators studied by Newey and
McFadden [27].
6. Some Monte Carlo Results
Below, we describe a Monte Carlo experiment designed to shed light on the small-sample
properties of our estimation strategy. In the tradition of the theoretical literature concerning
auctions, our model of bidding in section 4 was developed in terms of valuations for an object to
be sold at auction under the ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid format. Sealed-bid tenders are often used in
procurement—i.e., low-price, sealed-bid auctions at which a buyer (often a government agency)
seeks to ﬁnd the lowest-cost producer of some good or service. Because our empirical example
in section 7 involves investigating procurement of road resurfacing by a government agency, our
simulation study is couched in terms of a procurement auction. For the case of low-price, sealed-
bid procurement auctions, we collect several lemmata and their proofs in an appendix to this
paper.
In all of the experiments, the simulated data involved a truncated Pareto random variable C










0 < γ0 ≤ c, 1 < γ1.
Our simulation study involved samples of size T equal ﬁfty, one hundred, and two hundred with
n of three bidders; each sample was replicated 1,000 times. The lower bound of support, the
lowest cost c, was one, while the upper bound of support, the highest cost c, was three. The
parameters of the Pareto distribution were γ0 equal one and γ1 equal two.
Tocompareestimators, weconsideredthestrategiesproposedbyGPVandLPVaswellasour
copulaapproachforthreemembersoftheArchimedeanfamily—theClayton, Frank, andGumbel
copulae, which are the most frequently used copulae in empirical applications. The Archimedean
family was discussed in section 3 and copula-speciﬁc equations needed for estimation, such as
the survival representation, are presented in an appendix to this paper.
146.1. Performance using Independent Data
While the focus of our research concerns auctions in the presence of aﬃliation, it is useful
to compare the performance of the estimation strategies when signals are independent. Such an
analysis provides a benchmark to contrast the performance of a given strategy when dependence
is introduced. In addition, researchers may not know ex ante whether a given data set contains
dependence, or not, so there is value in investigating the performance of our semiparametric
estimator, which nests independence as a special case.
In the case of independence, we ﬁrst generated uniform draws from U(0,1). To convert the
ith uniform draw ui into a draw from the truncated Pareto distribution ci, we simply inverted the










Simulated costs ci were then mapped into simulated bids bi using the following symmetric equi-
librium bid function:
bi = β(ci) = ci +
  c
ci [1 − F0(u)]n−1 du
[1 − F0(ci)]n−1
where F0( ) is the truncated Pareto distribution speciﬁed in equation (6) and the integral was
computed numerically using quadrature.
The estimation procedures proposed by GPV and LPV are discussed in detail in their respec-
tive papers. When implementing their estimators, we employed the kernel function and adopted
the optimal bandwidths they suggested. To implement our copula approach, we ﬁrst modiﬁed the
approach of GPV to estimate G0(b) and g0(b) non-parametrically using the following estimators:






















Again, the division by (nT + 1) rather than nT is a rescaling to avoid numerical complications
arising at the boundary of the copula; e.g., recall (from section 3 above) that C(1,u2) equals u2













ˆ σ(nT + 1)−1/5
where d equal 2.978 is the bandwidth transformation constant from H¨ ardle [15] and ˆ σ was the
standard deviation of b which is the vector collecting the data {{bit}n
i=1}T
t=1. We then estimated θ
by the method of PML using the following pseudo log-likelihood function:







  G0(b1t),   G0(b2t),   G0(b3t);θ
  
15Table 2: Performance of Methods using IID Data, MSEP
Method T = 50 T = 100 T = 200
GPV 0.00188 0.00105 0.00058
LPV n/a 3.15053 0.02362
LPV (log transform) 1.13816 0.00945 0.00603
Clayton 0.00176 0.00100 0.00055
Frank 0.00185 0.00103 0.00057






Thus, the PML estimator ˆ θ is deﬁned by
ˆ θ = argmax
θ
  L(θ; b).
Using ˆ θ as well as   G0(b) and ˜ g0(b) from equations (7) and (8), we then computed estimates of
the partial derivatives of each respective survival copula according to
  S1(bi) = S1
 
1 −   G0(bi),1 −   G0(bi),1 −   G0(bi); ˆ θ
 
and
  S12(bi) = S12[1 −   G0(bi),1 −   G0(bi),1 −   G0(bi); ˆ θ]
when we were interested in recovering the pseudo-cost ˜ ci associated with bid bi. We then used
our ˜ g0(b) from equation (8) in conjunction with   S1(b) and   S12(b) to compute the pseudo-cost
associated with any bid b
˜ c = b −
  S1(b)
(n − 1)˜ g0(b)  S12(b)
. (9)
To account for biases, near the boundaries, that obtain because we kernel-smoothed the density,
we only used the bid function in the prior step to recover the cost if the observed bid was in the
range [b + h,b − h] where b was min{bit} and b was max{bit}.
By construction, in the Monte Carlo study, we knew the true costs associated with the sim-
ulated data b. Each estimation strategy was used to recover a predicted pseudo-cost associated
with each bid. This allowed us to evaluate the error associated with each of the predicted values;
i.e., the error for the ith cost is (ci − ˜ ci). To compare the performance of the estimation strategies,




(ci − ˜ ci)2
M
where M is the number of costs that survived the trimming described above for the particular
estimation strategy, in a given simulation.
Intable2, wepresenttheMSEPsthatobtainedusingtheestimationstrategieswithindependently-
and identically-distributed (IID) data, where the Monte Carlo samples were held ﬁxed across all





































Figure 1: Types of Dependence in Archimedean Copulae
methods. As expected, the MSEPs for all estimation strategies decrease as the sample size in-
creases, which can be seen by comparing the three right-most columns of the table along a given
row. Our results indicate that the copula estimator performed as well as the GPV estimator which
was designed for IID data. The MSEPs associated with the copula approaches, regardless of the
copula chosen, are comparable to the MSEPs obtained using the GPV approach. We considered
the LPV approach using the raw bids as well as the logarithm of bids, which is what the authors
suggested researchers consider when the distribution of bids is skewed. We found that the LPV
approach had diﬃculty with IID data when T was small (for example, 50) because the kernel
density took values close to zero and resulted in exceedingly high pseudo-costs. However, even
for the largest sample size, which involved 200 auctions, the MSEP obtained using the LPV ap-
proach was forty times that of GPV or our copula approach. Performance of the LPV approach
improved substantially when the logarithmic transformation was used and the pseudo costs were
recovered using an appropriate modiﬁcation of equation (9).
6.2. Performance using Aﬃliated Data
In our simulation study, with aﬃliated data, we considered data generated under diﬀerent
“levels” of dependence as well as diﬀerent “types” of dependence. We generated dependent data
from the Clayton, Frank, and Gumbel copulae to evaluate the performance of our method using
data that exhibited diﬀerent types of dependence. For example, in ﬁgure 1, we depict bivariate
draws generated from Clayton, Frank, and Gumbel copulae. The ﬁgures illustrate the type of de-
pendence inherent in the data varies depending on the copula used.3 In the scatterplots, and in our
simulation study, we ﬁxed the level of dependence according to Kendall’s τ—a non-parametric
measure of association which is deﬁned in terms of concordance. As was demonstrated by Gen-
est and MacKay [12], a direct relationship exists between Kendall’s τ and the parameter of an
Archimedean copula. In table 3, we list the correspondence between Kendall’s τ and the parame-
ter of each Archimedean copula we considered, here denoted θ. We exploited these relationships
to provide structure in our simulation study: they allowed us to ﬁx the level of dependence
across generating copulae by computing the copula parameters associated with given choices of
Kendall’s τ. For example, in ﬁgure 1, the parameters of the Clayton, Frank, and Gumbel copulae
were chosen to correspond with a value for Kendall’s τ of 0.75.
The discussion above centered around bivariate copulae, while in our simulation study we
considered auctions with three bidders. However, the relationship between Kendall’s τ and
3The type of dependence is easier to see using bivariate draws, which can be plotted in two dimensions. Of course,
the relationships apply to multivariate draws, as will become clear in the discussion that follows.
17Table 3: Kendall’s τ and Archimedean Copula Parameters
Copula Relationship
Clayton τ = θ
θ+2
Gumbel τ = 1 − 1
θ
Frank∗ τ = 1 − 4
θ[D1(θ) − 1]






Archimedean copulae derived by Genest and MacKay [12] can be applied to the multivariate
copulae we considered. Because we are concerned with the symmetric aﬃliated private-cost
paradigm (APCP), the marginal distribution functions of each random variable are identically
distributed. Note, too, that a copula is considered exchangeable if the marginal distribution func-
tions are the same and the arguments are treated equivalently by the copula; i.e., in the bivariate
case,
C(u1,u2) = C(u2,u1)
given U1 and U2 are identically distributed. Thus, exchangeability is a form of symmetry. Jouini
and Clemen [16] have demonstrated that, in the bivariate case, Kendall’s τ is suﬃcient to con-
struct an n-dimensional, exchangeable copula. This implies the unique relationships presented
in table 3 can be used to relate Kendall’s τ to the parameter of the multivariate Archimedean
copulae of interest, all of which are exchangeable.
To simulate data from the Clayton, Frank, or Gumbel copulae with dependence, we followed
the approach described by Cherubini, Luciano, and Vecchiato [4]. Theirs involves conditional
sampling where, initially, w1, a U(0,1) random draw, is taken and then u1 is set equal to it. The
next (dependent) draw u2 is found by solving
w2 = C2(u2|u1),
and so on, so that un is found by solving
wn = Cn(un|u1,...,un−1)
where all the wis are independent U(0,1) draws. Because the inverse function does not have a
closed-form for some copulae, the procedure is computationally intensive because the root of
each copula, conditional on the previous draws, must be solved numerically.
After converting the dependent draws into costs from the truncated Pareto distribution F0( ),
the simulated costs ci were then mapped into simulated bids bi using the following ﬁrst-order




  (n − 1)f0(ci)S12 [1 − F0(ci),1 − F0(ci),1 − F0(ci)]
S1 [1 − F0(ci),1 − F0(ci),1 − F0(ci)]
where β( ) is the equilibrium bid function. This ﬁrst-order condition is a standard ordinary dif-
ferential equation which, subject to the boundary condition
β(c) = c,
18yields the symmetric equilibrium bid function under aﬃliation








(n − 1)f0(w)S12 [1 − F0(w),1 − F0(w),1 − F0(w)]




The results from the discussion above allowed us to conduct a Monte Carlo study using
dependent data in which we varied the number of auctions, the copula used to generate the de-
pendent data, and the amount of dependence inherent in the generating copula. Kendall’s τ
provided a convenient way of assigning the same level of dependence to simulations generated
under diﬀerent copulae. Again, we compared the performance of the GPV and the LPV estima-
tion strategies as well as our copula approach in which the Clayton, Frank, and Gumbel copulae
were chosen for estimation, regardless of the generating copula. This exercise also provides
insight into the question of which copula should be chosen in empirical applications and helps
to determine the importance of copula choice in these auction models; cf. Fermanian [9] for
goodness-of-ﬁt tests for copulae.
In the next three tables, we present the MSEPs obtained using each of the estimation strate-
gies with dependent data generated from a speciﬁc Archimedean copula. In particular, in table
4, we present results when data were generated from the Clayton copula. Likewise, in tables
5 and 6, we present the MSEPs when data were generated from the Frank and Gumbel copu-
lae, respectively. In each table, the ﬁrst column indicates the level of dependence, as measured
by Kendall’s τ. We generated data from each copula using the copula-speciﬁc parameter corre-
sponding to Kendall’s τ equal to 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75. The second column in each table describes
the estimation strategy used, while the last three columns present the MSEPs for diﬀerent sam-
ples sizes: T equal to ﬁfty, one hundred, and two hundred auctions each having n equal to three
bidders.
Each of the tables reveals that the GPV estimation strategy is an inappropriate one when
signals are aﬃliated: as the dependence increases, the MSEPs increase. In addition, for a given
level of dependence, increasing the sample size often yielded an higher MSEP under GPV. This
is clearly unfortunate, but perhaps not surprising: under GPV, in the presence of aﬃliation, the
measurement equation is mis-speciﬁed.
In contrast, the simulation results for the LPV non-parametric estimation strategy, which was
designed to account for aﬃliation, show promise. Regardless of the copula used to generate the
data or the level of dependence in the data, the performance of the LPV method improved as the
sample size increased. Furthermore, the MSEPs obtained using the LPV method on dependent
data were substantially lower than those found for that method when independent signals were
used.
Interestingly, this does not hold for the LPV approach when a logarithmic transformation of
the bids was used. While the transformation was attractive for independent data, the use of the
raw bids in the LPV approach often outperformed the log-transformed bids, at least in terms of
MSEP, for dependent data. In fact, the MSEP for the LPV approach when no transformation
was used is always lower than that of the logarithmic transformation for τ equal 0.75, regardless
of the copula used to generate the data. The logarithmic transformation was introduced so that
fewer data would be trimmed for skewed bid distributions. With highly-dependent data, this
rationale may no longer hold as one high (low) bid means other bids are more likely to be high
(low). Consequently, the logarithmic transformation may result in an increase in the number of
bids that are trimmed, which is what happened in the Monte Carlo study.
Perhaps not surprisingly, for any given simulation, the lowest MSEPs of all the estimation
strategies obtained for our copula approach when it was used to estimate the model that generated
19Table 4: Performance of Methods using Data Generated from Clayton Copula, MSEP
Dependence Method T = 50 T = 100 T = 200
τ = 0.25
GPV 0.00289 0.00189 0.00143
LPV 0.01079 0.00558 0.00341
LPV (log transform) 0.00675 0.00352 0.00204
Clayton 0.00185 0.00104 0.00059
Frank 0.00195 0.00113 0.00070
Gumbel 0.00215 0.00154 0.00114
τ = 0.50
GPV 0.00386 0.00374 0.00487
LPV 0.00682 0.00372 0.00228
LPV (log transform) 0.00705 0.00487 0.00357
Clayton 0.00187 0.00104 0.00057
Frank 0.00229 0.00172 0.00136
Gumbel 0.00333 0.00246 0.00199
τ = 0.75
GPV 0.01033 0.01271 0.01613
LPV 0.01364 0.01222 0.00980
LPV (log transform) 0.02240 0.02343 0.01953
Clayton 0.00267 0.00131 0.00064
Frank 0.00481 0.00433 0.00382
Gumbel 0.00641 0.00583 0.00545
the data. Note, too, that our copula approach always performed well when either the Frank or
the Gumbel copulae were used in estimation, regardless of the copula that generated the data.
The type of dependence inherent in the Clayton copula is quite speciﬁc, as illustrated in ﬁgure
1. Because of this, the simulation results show that when our copula approach used the Clayton
copula in the estimation, but the data were not generated from a Clayton copula, the MSEPs were
closer to those obtained using the LPV method.
7. An Empirical Application
To illustrate the feasibility of our estimation strategy, we have chosen to implement it using
data from low-price, sealed-bid, procurement auctions held by the Department of Transportation
in the State of Michigan. At these auctions, qualiﬁed ﬁrms are invited to bid on jobs that involve
resurfacing roads in Michigan. We have chosen this type of auction because the task at hand is
quite well-understood. In addition, there are reasons to believe that ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics
make the private-cost paradigm a reasonable assumption; e.g., managerial ability at speciﬁc ﬁrms
can diﬀer considerably. On the other hand, other factors suggest that the cost signals of individual
bidders could be dependent, even aﬃliated; e.g., these ﬁrms hire labour services in the same
market and face similar costs for inputs, such as energy as well as paving inputs. Thus, the
APCP seems reasonable. We have eschewed investigating issues relating to asymmetries across
bidders (i.e., introducing Fis that vary across bidders) because we simply have insuﬃcient data to
identify such models. Instead, we focus on the symmetric APCP outlined above and developed
further in the ﬁrst section of the appendix to this paper. As no reserve price exists at these
auctions, we treat the number of participants as if it were the number of potential bidders and
focus on auctions at which three bidders participated. In short, we are ignoring the potential
20Table 5: Performance of Methods using Data Generated from Frank Copula, MSEP
Dependence Method T = 50 T = 100 T = 200
τ = 0.25
GPV 0.00468 0.00323 0.00238
LPV 0.01064 0.00553 0.00329
LPV (log transform) 0.00808 0.00419 0.00249
Clayton 0.00290 0.00187 0.00135
Frank 0.00217 0.00115 0.00064
Gumbel 0.00236 0.00153 0.00106
τ = 0.50
GPV 0.00413 0.00353 0.00380
LPV 0.00972 0.00672 0.00457
LPV (log transform) 0.01064 0.00920 0.00681
Clayton 0.00484 0.00451 0.00476
Frank 0.00178 0.00096 0.00055
Gumbel 0.00292 0.00199 0.00151
τ = 0.75
GPV 0.01658 0.01826 0.02052
LPV 0.02348 0.02192 0.01780
LPV (log transform) 0.03078 0.03175 0.02665
Clayton 0.02398 0.02430 0.02428
Frank 0.00160 0.00089 0.00048
Gumbel 0.00333 0.00293 0.00298
importance of participation costs which others, including Li [21], have investigated elsewhere.
In table 7, we present the summary descriptive statistics concerning our sample of 834 obser-
vations from 278 auctions. Our bid variable is the price per mile. Notice that both the winning
bids as well as all tendered bids vary considerably, from a low of $41,760.32 per mile to an high
of $5,693,872.81 per mile. What explains this variation? Well, presumbably heterogeneity in the
tasks that need to be performed. One way to control for this heterogeneity would be to retrieve
each and every contract and then to construct covariates from those contracts. Unfortunately, the
State of Michigan cannot provide us with this information, at least not any time soon.
How can we deal with this heterogeneity? Well, in our case, we have an engineer’s estimate
x of the cost per mile of performing the project. Thus, we condition on this exogenous covari-
ate when estimating G0
0(b|x) and g0
0(b|x). In table 8, we present the PML estimates as well as
standard errors of the copula parameters. We used the bootstrap to calculate the standard errors:
speciﬁcally, we drew 278 triplets of bids along with the engineer’s estimate for that auction at
random, with replacement, from the sample distribution to form bootstrap estimates   G∗
0(b|x) and
  g∗
0(b|x). We then estimated the dependence parameter θ for each chosen copula, replicating this
for 1,000 bootstrap samples.
Of course, we cannot compare directly the parameter estimates across copulae because the
values of the parameters are speciﬁc to a given copula and imply diﬀerent levels of dependence.
Thus, alongside these parameter estimates, we present the corresponding estimated values of
Kendall’s τ, with standard errors, again obtained via the bootstrap.
The estimates, and their standard errors, indicate considerable (and signiﬁcantly) positive
dependence—aﬃliation—within the Archimedean family of copulae. In ﬁgure 2, we depict
  f0(c|x), a non-parametric estimate of f 0
0(c|x) admitting dependence, evaluated at the sample me-
dian of x for each copula used in estimating the pseudo-costs. The PML estimates of f 0
0(c|x) are
21Table 6: Performance of Methods using Data Generated from Gumbel Copula, MSEP
Dependence Method T = 50 T = 100 T = 200
τ = 0.25
GPV 0.00452 0.00295 0.00219
LPV 0.01408 0.00747 0.00463
LPV (log transform) 0.00967 0.00514 0.00323
Clayton 0.00354 0.00228 0.00180
Frank 0.00305 0.00178 0.00123
Gumbel 0.00216 0.00114 0.00065
τ = 0.50
GPV 0.00383 0.00323 0.00331
LPV 0.01240 0.00984 0.00688
LPV (log transform) 0.01110 0.00915 0.00697
Clayton 0.00787 0.00694 0.00650
Frank 0.00352 0.00291 0.00227
Gumbel 0.00150 0.00084 0.00046
τ = 0.75
GPV 0.02047 0.02107 0.02173
LPV 0.03073 0.02827 0.02389
LPV (log transform) 0.03266 0.03167 0.02728
Clayton 0.02906 0.02760 0.02514
Frank 0.00542 0.00530 0.00474
Gumbel 0.00090 0.00047 0.00024
Table 7: Sample Descriptive Statistics—Dollars/Mile, n = 3, T = 278
Variable Mean St. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Engineer’s Estimate 475,544.54 491,006.52 307,331.26 54,574.41 3,694,272.59
Winning Bid 466,468.63 507,025.81 286,102.57 41,760.32 3,882,524.81
All Tendered Bids 507,332.42 564,842.58 317,814.77 41,760.32 5,693,872.81
all very close, regardless of the copula used in estimation.
In ﬁgure 3, we present the bid function (pseudo-costs) predicted by our approach. Notice
how our estimates are very close to the 45◦-line. In ﬁgure 4, we plot our pseudo-cost estimates
versus those estimated using the methods of GPV. One of the pseudo-costs estimated by the
method of GPV is negative, while no costs are estimated to be negative using our approach. The
main point, however, is that our PML estimated pseudo-costs are systematically above the GPV
estimates. In the presence of aﬃliation, an higher cost is implied for a given bid than under
independence because players (typically) bid closer to their costs. The average absolute relative
diﬀerence between the GPV estimates and the PML estimates obtained using the Clayton, Frank,
and Gumbel copulae are 13.27 percent, 20.75 percent, and 19.24 percent, respectively.
Why is aﬃliation potentially interesting to an economist? In ﬁgure 5, we illustrate that, in
the presence of aﬃliation, low-cost bidders (those who are likely to win the auction) behave
more competitively than would be the case under independence. The ﬁgure was constructed
using the analytic bid function for the Frank copula with parameters corresponding to the values
for Kendall’s τ denoted in the ﬁgure. Here, τ∗ equals the value estimated using a Frank copula
in the application given in table 8. In fact, even with just three bidders, the winners (typically
those with low costs) bid very close to their costs. Aﬃliation disciplines bidders: when a bidder
contemplates his having the lowest cost, and thus winning the auction, he must also recognize
22Table 8: Copula Parameter and Kendall’s τ Estimates
Copula Parameter Kendall’s τ
Copula Estimate St. Err. Estimate St. Err.
Clayton 3.8028 0.3177 0.6553 0.0211
Frank 11.2898 0.6645 0.6973 0.0167
Gumbel 3.0187 0.1319 0.6687 0.0176
that, under aﬃliation, his opponents will probably have costs close to his, and this forces him to
bid more aggressively than he would under independence.
8. Summary and Conclusions
Within the aﬃliated private-values paradigm, we have developed a tractable empirical model
ofequilibriumbehaviouratﬁrst-price, sealed-bidauctions. Whilethemodelisnon-parametrically
identiﬁed, the rate of convergence is slow when the number of bidders is even moderately large.
Also, the aﬃliation suﬃcient for the measurement equation in an empirical speciﬁcation to con-
stitute an equilibrium is diﬃcult to preserve in the course of non-parametric estimation. Thus,
we have developed a semiparametric estimation strategy, which respects aﬃliation as well as
avoids the curse of dimensionality that relates to the number of bidders, focusing our atten-
tion on the Archimedean family of copulae and implementing this framework using particular
members—the Clayton, Frank, and Gumbel copulae. We have applied our framework to data
from low-price, sealed-bid auctions used by the Michigan Department of Transportation to pro-
cure road-resurfacing services, rejecting the hypothesis of independence and ﬁnding signiﬁcant
(and high) aﬃliation in cost signals. Ignoring this potential aﬃliation has important implications
concerning estimates of the procurement-cost distribution, which can be important to a policy-
maker seeking to design the optimal procurement mechanism.









































Figure 2: PML Estimates of f0
0 (c|x) Evaluated at Sample Median of Engineer’s Estimate x

























Figure 3: Bids versus PML Estimated Dependent Pseudo-Costs




































Figure 4: GPV versus PML Estimated Dependent Pseudo-Costs





















Figure 5: Bid Functions: Independence as well as Aﬃliation
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Appendix
In this appendix, we present calculations too cumbersome for inclusion in the text of the
paper as well as describe the creation of the data set used.
Low-Price, Sealed-Bid, Procurement-Auction Model
In this section of the appendix, we present the calculations necessary to implement the low-
price, sealed-bid, procurement-auction model investigated in section 6 and implemented in sec-
tion 7.
We ﬁrst extend the result of Nelsen [26] concerning the copula representation of the bivariate
survival copula to the case of n of three or greater, and then use this result, in conjunction with
the GPV transformation, to isolate the pseudo-costs in a symmetric aﬃliated private-cost model
of a procurement auction.
Lemma 2:






Pr(Ci < ci,Cj < cj) − ...+
(−1)n Pr(C1 < c1,...,Cn < cn).
Proof.
The proof is by induction. We begin by demonstrating the result for the case of n equal two, and
then demonstrate it for n greater than two. Note that, when n is two, we have
Pr(C1 ≥ c1,C2 ≥ c2) = Pr(C1 ≥ c1) − Pr(C1 ≥ c1,C2 < c2)
= 1 − Pr(C1 < c1) − [Pr(C1 ≥ c1,C2 < c2) − Pr(C1 < c1,C2 < c2)]
= 1 − Pr(C1 < c1) − Pr(C2 < c2) + Pr(C1 < c1,C2 < c2).
Now, suppose the result holds for the case of (n − 1) where n is three or greater, then
Pr(C1 ≥ c1,...,Cn ≥ cn) = Pr(C1 ≥ c1,...,Cn−1 ≥ cn−1)−
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Pr(Ci < ci|Cn < cn)+
 
1≤i≤j≤n−1
Pr(Ci < ci,Cj < cj|Cn < cn) − ...+








Pr(Ci < ci,Cj < cj) − ...+
(−1)n Pr(C1 < c1,...,Cn < cn)
Note that this lemma gives a copula representation of the survival copula, which is useful in
the characterization of the ﬁrst-order condition of the equilibrium bid at a procurement auction.
The lemma is a generalization of the case for n of two given by Nelsen [26] on page 28. We
introduce the notation S to denote the survival copula and deﬁne a survival copula as






Pr(Ci < ci,Cj < cj) − ...+
(−1)n Pr(C1 < c1,...,Cn < cn)
where Fi( ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of variable Ci.
Lemma 3:
Pr(C2 ≥ c2,...,Cn ≥ cn|c1) = S1[1 − F0(c1),...,1 − F0(cn)]
where S1 denotes the partial derivative of S with respect to the ﬁrst component.
27Proof.
Let fC(c1,...,cn) denote the probability density function corresponding to FC(c1,...,cn). Now,








Diﬀerentiating both sides of the last equality with respect to c1 yields
−S1[1 − F0(c1),...,1 − F0(cn)]f0(c1) = −
 
c2










= S1[1 − F0(c1),...,1 − F0(cn)]. (10)
But the left-hand side of equation (10) is just Pr(C2 ≥ c2,...,Cn ≥ cn|c1). The desired result
then follows.
Within the APCP, for any bidder (focus, say, on bidder 1), we assume that he maximizes
expected proﬁt
E[π(b1,c1)] = (b1 − c1)S1
 
1 − F0(c1),1 − F0[β−1(b1)],...,1 − F0[β−1(b1)]
 
by choice of bid b1 where c1 is bidder 1’s private cost and where β( ) is a strictly monotonically
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which can be re-written as
S1
 
1 − F0(c1),1 − F0[β−1(b1)],...,1 − F0[β−1(b1)]
 















1 − F0(c1),1 − F0[β−1(b1)],...,1 − F0[β−1(b1)]
 
∀j , k.








so we can re-arrange terms to get
c1 = b1 −
S1[1 −G0(b1),1 −G0(b1),...,1 −G0(b1)]
(n − 1)g0(b1)S12[1 −G0(b1),1 −G0(b1),...,1 −G0(b1)]
,
which expresses bidder 1’s cost solely as a function of the bid.
Data
The data for the empirical part of this paper, which concern procurement contracts for road
resurfacing, were provided in raw form by the Department of Transportation of the State of
Michigan. To create the ﬁnal data set, we ﬁrst extracted contract length and determined the num-
ber of bidders at each auction. Next, we looked for observations having missing data, scanning
each ﬁle to ensure that all contract lengths were properly extracted. Finally, we checked to ensure
that all data were in the same units; e.g., we converted contracts that were measured in kilometres
into miles. At this point, we had 4,200 observations concerning 1,041 contracts. Subsequently,
we focused on auctions having n of three; this constrained us to 278 auctions.
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